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Cognitive Bias

Cognitive bias could unwittingly be influencing the outcome of interviews. Max McLean and Jason Roach explain the concept of cognitive bias and present their nine point plan called COMPACTED to provide advice on how best to navigate the dangers of cognitive bias in witness interviews.


Cognitive bias is part of the human condition, and, as humans, investigators are as susceptible to their often subtle influences as anybody else. 

Human cognitive ability, such as being able to remember names, faces and phone numbers, being able to think in abstract ways and communication via language, far outstrips that of our nearest primate cousins.

Evolutionary psychologists explain that we have such wonderful brains as a direct result of shaping by the evolutionary pressures our ancestors faced in their battle to survive and produce off-spring. We quite literally have the brains they couldn’t even dream of. 





Cognitive bias could manifest itself in a number of ways in an investigation. This includes confirmation bias. In complex cases it can be common for an investigator to try to amass evidence which ‘proves’ that their prime suspect committed the crime, before they have exhausted the list of potential suspects.

This common trap can make them blind to (or even worse dismissive of) evidence to the contrary. The hard-wired default human position being to prove not disprove. 

If instead, we work to disprove our theories (known as falsification in scientific circles) but do not succeed, then the chances are that we are right and that justice will be served. 

Investigators will recognise this as 'playing devil’s advocate' or eliminating potential defence theories with the same energy and commitment as that used to gather evidence implicating the suspect. 





Acting on intuition is often jumping to premature conclusions. That is acting before establishing and considering all the facts and possibilities available. For example, in the a previous case of the sexual assault and brutal murder of the young girl, the first officers upon the scene immediately decided (intuitively) that her family could not have been involved. 

This affected the course of the ensuing investigation, whereby for example, appropriate witness statements, suspect interviews and forensic work were not conducted as a consequence (known as an anchoring heuristic). Criminal investigative decision making, therefore, should be ‘rational’ and methodical and not based on intuition

 Fallibility of human memory

What we remember depends on what we believe (Begley, 2005). We are not objective thinkers. How we think reflects who we are, for example, our experiences and attitudes. 
These affect what we remember and how we remember it.

For example, belief perseverance dictates that we are more likely to remember positive events and information (i.e. which support our theory) than negative ones (i.e. which don’t). In an investigative context, more weight is often placed on evidence which supports our hypothesis than on evidence which weakens it.





Despite being wonderful creations, human brains are essentially lazy.

 As such, we create cognitive ‘short-cuts’ to help us process information faster and with less effort known as schemas. 

Social psychologists explain that this is how stereotypes (which often represent prejudice and lead to discrimination) are formed. 





Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) is where we attribute different causal explanations to our behaviour than to the behaviour of others, even though the behavior is the same. 

For example, we may consider we have used violence only in self-defence whereby others might consider it to be illustrative of a more pervasive violent tendency, and as such, we are likely to be violent again in the future. 





Even though we may have been consistently wrong on consecutive occasions our faith in being right next time is generally not diminished. 

This type of cognitive bias presents an obvious trap for investigators. For example, when despite evidence to the contrary, the investigator remains fixed that their prime suspect did the crime. 







Even in these days of progressive technology, managing conversation is the core skill of any policing task. Investigation is still about knowing how to talk to and listen (i.e. communicate effectively) with people.

On a daily basis, investigators have to meet with the challenge of making meaningful conversation with human beings who often vary immensely in terms of both their ability and willingness to communicate, in situations which range from ones of apathy through to extreme distress.  It is a daunting task, yet one that the police are perceived to be experts at.

There is a direct link between public perceptions of how an individual officer has fulfilled this core task of interviewing and the degree of confidence within the community that the Police can count upon.  

In short, how an investigator manages the conversation provides an insight into the quality of the service being provided.  Quality interviews fulfil both legal and ethical criteria and generate faith in a service to do what is ‘right’ by the law and what is ‘right’ by the person. 

We must not therefore, play down the importance of this. For example, studies have frequently shown that eyewitnesses are the central and most important feature of criminal investigations and that the completeness and accuracy of the witness account is the main factor which determines the successful resolution of a case.

Surely, the aim of investigative interviewing is to obtain accurate and reliable accounts from victims, witnesses or suspects about matters under police investigation using an investigative mindset/? Although, we contend that there is an acute lack of detail about what an investigative mindset exactly is.

The way in which an investigator questions a witness will dramatically affect the completeness and accuracy of the account obtained.  
The assumption has always been that the statement is the witness’ own words – but is this really the case?

We might consider there are three stages within an encounter between a witness and an officer;
(i)	what the witness knows to be true;
(ii)	the social exchange between the witness and the Police Officer; and
(iii)	the written statement itself

At all points of encounter both the investigator and witness are vulnerable to cognitive bias and error. Let’s take a look at what happens in stage (ii), the social exchange that affects stage (iii), the written statement. 

This social exchange is the psychological and mental process of the investigator turning (ii) to (iii). (i) is the persons mind, between (i) and (ii) the filter is the investigators frame of reference which has to do with their prior knowledge of the case, of facts of the matter, type of case, usual hypotheses and points to prove.

This filter can result in the Investigator seeking information which fits their frame of reference.  Where information that does not fit is offered by a witness, the investigator is left to do one of three things, either:-


	(i) include the information in full at the apparent expense of plausibility;			(ii) distort the information to fit those circumstances already known; or 			(iii) omit the information altogether

The witness is the most vulnerable interviewee.  Witnesses will wish to appear co-operative and competent respondents and will provide answers which it is assumed the questioner wants to hear.





Some time ago, Max undertook an empirical study of police interviews with witnesses, using 16 actual recorded interviews and comparing them with the final written witness statements produced by investigators (Mclean, 1992). It was found that in all the interviews examined, police officers excluded important pieces of information and possible clues. 

On average they missed out 14 items relevant to the investigation and in one case excluded 38. A large proportion of the officers also ignored information that contradicted earlier evidence or the opinion of the interviewer. Sixty-five per cent of the inquiries were either leading questions or considered 'risky' because they were likely to produce a misleading or distorted answer. 

Investigators also talked too much. In one case a man was allowed only 79 seconds to describe a brawl in a public house. It was also found that on 4 occasions the police officer wrote down a fact that was clearly contrary to what the witness said. Examples of the variety of, and extent to which, confirmation bias can and do affect investigations. The pursuit of plausibility can have a devastating effect on an investigation.

The implications for the investigative and judicial processes are clear. All 16 statements had been signed as a true record by the respective witness yet not one contained all the relevant information being offered by that witness. Investigators working only with the final written product had one arm tied behind their back.

We wonder what a more recent follow up study would find.  At the time of the first research, cognitive interviewing was just being introduced and the first considerations were being given to tape recording interviews with significant witnesses in serious cases. 

There is no doubt that the skills set acquired by today's investigators has expanded exponentially, however not enough consideration is given to cognitive bias traps.


Our experiences as a Senior Investigator (and Head of CID) and as a forensic psychologist suggest to us strongly that ‘facts’ are likely to still be missed, misinterpreted, and assumptions are still being made, with cognitive bias a prime suspect. 

Investigators still have to direct for further interviews with witnesses to be undertaken when a key fact has emerged elsewhere, or can still form their policy decisions based upon a shared understanding amongst the team of a key fact. For example, that a particular weapon had been used, when in fact it had not, or that the suspect was of a particular description which later proved wildly inaccurate (the usual suspects?).

Investigators are of course only human - that's the trouble! It may only be natural to filter out that which doesn't easily fit with our theories or that which is thought of as unnecessary detail. 

Paraphrasing, editing and reducing information are a natural part of the mind's ability to make sense of what it takes in and a subtle shaping of information can be necessary to cope with the cognitive load, as demonstrated by our discussion of schemas and heuristics 

There are ever increasing pressures upon the modern detective to deliver results within a time frame, often in the glare of the media - pressures which act as a best friend to cognitive bias. 

Although the Murder Manual and Core Investigative Doctrine briefly mention cognitive bias, this can be considered too cursory and insufficient for investigators seeking to be ‘objective’ and ‘open-minded’. 

As we have shown, cognitive bias can take many different forms, only some mentioned here, where others include; tunnel vision (eg. where investigators form an early impression of events and do not entertain alternatives); hindsight bias (eg. where cold case reviewers fail to appreciate the context in which an investigation was conducted); and memory limitation and fallibility (eg. often associated with eyewitness reports and statements).


However, in the interest of balance, we are not all cognitively doomed as investigators. 

Cognitive bias and its subtle (and not so subtle) affects on investigators are beginning to be realised. For example, language used  such as ‘eliminate from our enquiries,’ and the ability of the best investigators to truly test their theories, and the obligations of the disclosure regime illustrate how police thinking and methods have begun to take cognitive bias on board. 

The tendency to prove is therefore a human psychological bias which may lead to a correct result more often than not, but it can and does de-rail and corrupt criminal investigations which can lead to not solving a crime or worse culminate in gross miscarriages of justice. While the Murder Manual quite rightly recommends investigators ‘keep an open mind’, inherent human cognitive bias often conspires to intervene. 

Returning to our core theme that nothing matters more than the witness, and that confidence in policing stems directly from that interaction, we now offer some examples of how cognitive bias might be minimised in interview situations. 






Cognitive load - to be managed by the Investigator. Slow down, take notes and share the work between team members. Managers should emphasise awareness and the effect of cognitive bias on investigations and encourage an open investigative mindset.

Open questions – let the interviewee talk and listen carefully. Use silence as an effective tool for seeking more detail.

Mindset - an investigative one. Test the account with what has been established, be cautious of bias on the part of both interviewer and witness.
 
Planning – effective interviews require foresight and effort before any conversation. Have a plan and prepare beforehand for possible obstacles to gaining as full and accurate an account as possible.

Advisor – an interview advisor is essential in major or complex cases. Let the advisor assist with your cognitive load by focussing their skills on harvesting detailed and accurate accounts by using investigators effectively.

Co – interviewer – again essential in major or complex cases. Effective use of a co-interviewer allows content summarising, variations in questioning, gaps to be spotted and concentration on the interviewee's responses.

Temporal – a focus on time, detail and context in questioning and analysing responses which offers greater accuracy and completeness in the account. Do not rush your questions. Let the witness speak fully and freely.
Emotional – investigative questions which focus on emotions (eg. how did you feel?) reveal powerful, often unequivocal detail.

Detail – seek fine grain detail and analyse any gaps in accounts.

This article is based on a one-day course developed for SIOs and detectives and has been accredited as CPD compliant. For details please contact Jason Roach or visit the Crime and Policing Group website at http://www2.hud.ac.uk/hhs/acc/cpg_index.php (​http:​/​​/​www2.hud.ac.uk​/​hhs​/​acc​/​cpg_index.php​)
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